

Message Text

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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 1, 1974
(SALT TWO-387)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON AT THE
SALT TWO MEETING OF MARCH 1, 1974.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
MARCH 1, 1974

MR. MINISTER

I

TODAY I WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE TO SET FORTH MY VIEWS ON THE
FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR A PERMANENT
AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. IN GENERAL, I WOULD
LIKE TO DISCUSS THE CONCEPT OF VERIFIABILITY AS IT APPLIES TO ANY
ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, AND, IN PARTICULAR, I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS
THE QUESTION OF VERIFYING AN AGREEMENT LIMITING ICBMS EQUIPPED
WITH MIRVS.

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II

A UNIQUE ELEMENT OF BOTH THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS THE PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION OF THESE AGREEMENTS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. A NO LESS UNIQUE COROLLARY ELEMENT OF THIS PROVISION IS THE UNDERTAKING BY BOTH PARTIES NOT TO INTERFERE WITH SUCH MEANS OF VERIFICATION. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY THAT AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT HAS INCLUDED SUCH A VERIFICATION PROVISION AND I BELIEVE ITS IMPORTANCE SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

OUR GOVERNMENTS UNDERSTAND THAT EACH PART TO THESE AGREEMENTS MUST HAVE CONFIDENCE IN COMPLIANCE BY THE OTHER SIDE WITH ANY LIMITATIONS NEGOTIATED BY THE SIDES, AND THEY HAVE REAFFIRMED THIS UNDERSTANDING IN THE JUNE 21, 1973 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. IN ADDITION, OUR GOVERNMENTS UNDERSTAND THAT IN ORDER TO ENHANCE SUCH CONFIDENCE, THE LIMITATIONS SHOULD BE FORMULATED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO BE VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THE IMPORTANCE WHICH EACH SIDE ATTACHES TO FORMULATIONS WHICH MAKE POSSIBLE ADEQUATE VERIFICATION BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WAS CLEARLY REFLECTED IN THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT.

WE, IN OUR PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS, AND IN CONFORMITY WITH THE JUNE 21 BASIC PRINCIPLES, ARE DISCUSSING IN GREATER DEPTH THAN IN THE PAST CERTAIN QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IN DEVELOPING LIMITATIONS ON QUALITATIVE, AS WELL AS QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS, THE ISSUES OF ENSURING ADEQUATE VERIFICATION MAY BE DIFFICULT. HOWEVER, THE SIDES HAVE BEFORE THEM THE RECORD OF THEIR WORK ON BOTH THE ABM TREATY AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION TO DEALING WITH QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS, THESE AGREEMENTS DEALT IN SOME DEGREE WITH QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS. I BELIEVE THE EXPERIENCE GAINED IN OUR EARLIER EXAMINATION OF THE ISSUE, PLUS OUR MUTUALLY AGREED POSITION ON THE NECESSITY OF FORMULATING ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE LIMITATIONS, SHOULD SERVE US WELL IN THE IMPORTANT WORK WHICH LIES BEFORE US.

III

AT OUR LAST MEETING, THE U.S. SIDE DISCUSSED THE CONCEPT OF CONTROLLING MIRVS ON ICBMS, BY LIMITING THE TOTAL THROW-WEIGHT OF
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MIRVED ICBMS. PREVIOUS SOVIET STATEMENTS INDICATE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE SHARES AN INTEREST IN LIMITING MIRVS, WHICH ARE AN IMPORTANT QUALITATIVE ASPECT OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP.

IN MY VIEW, THERE ARE TWO QUESTIONS WHICH ARE CENTRAL TO THE PROBLEM OF VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH EQUAL LIMITATIONS ON THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF MIRVED ICBMS. FIRST, EACH SIDE MUST BE ABLE TO ASCERTAIN WITH ACCEPTABLE PRECISION THE THROW-WEIGHT OF EACH OF THE TYPES OF MIRVED ICBMS WHICH CAN BE DEPLOYED BY THE

OTHER SIDE. SECOND, EACH SIDE MUST BE ABLE TO ASCERTAIN THE NUMBER OF EACH TYPE OF MIRVED ICBM WHICH IS DEPLOYED. THE ABILITY TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS DEPENDS UPON SUCH FACTORS AS THE ABILITY OF THE SIDES TO IDENTIFY AND MONITOR THE TESTING OF MIRVED ICBMS, AND THEIR ABILITY TO DETERMINE WHICH LAUNCHERS AVAILABLE TO THE OTHER SIDE CAN ACCOMMODATE SUCH MISSILES. THE PROVISIONS OF AN AGREEMENT WILL NEED TO BE SO FORMULATED AS TO ASSURE ADEQUATE CONFIDENCE IN ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

YOU WILL RECALL THAT IN MY LAST STATEMENT I SAID THAT THE CONCEPT OF LIMITING THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS WITH MIRVS WOULD APPLY ONLY TO THOSE ICBMS WITH MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES WHICH ARE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE. EXISTING ICBMS WITH MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES NOT INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN THIS CEILING ON AGGREGATE ICBM MIRV THROW-WEIGHT. THE ISSUES OF THE MODIFICATION AND FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH EXCLUDED MRV SYSTEMS, AND OF THE POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW, NON-INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE MRV SYSTEMS, WILL HAVE TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THE ASSURANCE THE SIDES CAN HAVE FROM NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION THAT THESE SYSTEMS ARE, AND REMAIN, DISTINGUISHABLE FROM MIRV SYSTEMS.

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